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by the defendant.121 Where the former proceeding was a trial, this should
not prove to be too difficult. However, where the former proceeding was a
preliminary hearing and the witness was not actually cross-examined by
the defendant, the testimony will not be admissible. Moreover, although the
holding technically applies only to situations where there has been no cross-
examination, in view of the court's comments on preliminary hearings,22
the implication is strong that the court would still disapprove even if there
has been actual cross-examination. It therefore appears that, at least in Ohio,
it may be nearly impossible to use preliminary hearing testimony at a later
trial because the state's highest court has decided that the mere opportunity
to cross-examine will not be sufficient to guarantee a defendant his sixth
amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
CHRISTOPHER C. MANTHEY
CAROL G. SIMONETTI
121 55 Ohio St. 2d at 194, 378 N.E.2d at 495.
222 Id. at 196, 378 N.E.2d at 496.
FEDERAL GIFT TAXATION
Nontaxable Transfers 9 Interest-Free Loans
Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
NTEREST-FREE FAMILY LOANS remain outside the purview of the federal
estate and gift tax statutes despite the recent efforts of the Internal Revenue
Service to convince the judiciary that, in such loans, the fair market value of
the foregone interest is a gift. This is an extrapolation of the Service's efforts
to find income to the recipient in other interest-free money situations. In
light of the Service's limited activity in dealing with tax consequences of the
interest-free loans, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Crown v. Commissioner'
will be an important reference for estate and tax planning. Doubtlessly, the
Service will register its non-acquiescence to Crown as it did with Johnson
v. United States.' Consequently, the issue of interest-free family loans will
be reviewed in the future by other circuits.
1585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
2 Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 408. This ruling elaborates on §§ 2501, 2511, 2512(b)
in the context of a loan between father and son. The Ruling explains the occurrence of a
gift by evaluating the use of the money on the basis of each quarter such use was permitted.
3 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
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Lester Crown and his two brothers were partners in Areljay Company,
which was unincorporated. Prior to and during 1967 Areljay loaned ap-
proximately $18,000,000, interest-free, to twenty-four trusts established for
the benefit of the partners' children and other relatives., The trusts used the
loans to invest in another partnership, Henry Crown & Company, also un-
incorporated. The Commissioner calculated a deficiency against Lester
Crown in 1973, determining that the forebearance of interest on the loans
resulted in a taxable gift to the trusts.' In other words, the Commissioner
claimed that Lester Crown gave a taxable gift to the trusts, this gift
being equal to the amount of outstanding interest that was not
collected on the loans to the trust. Crown contested the Commissioner's
findings, using the Tax Court as his forum. The court held for Crown, stating
that the making of a non-interest bearing loan under these circumstances
is not a taxable event.' On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's decision, noting the possibility of a significant loophole in the gift
tax laws, but refusing to close it by judicial construction.'
The Commissioner urged reversal based on three general arguments:
first, that the transfer of money resulted in an economic benefit arising from
an unequal exchange and/or transfer of property; second, that the benefit
was measurable; and third, that the policy considerations arising from
similar situations of a transfer of economic benefit merited reversal of the
Tax Court's decision The Commissioner attempted to show a transfer
of property under Code Section 2501 and the valuation under Section
2512(b).1 But the court said specific statutory authority dealing with in-
terest-free loans was lacking."1
4 585 F.2d at 235. Approximately 13% of the trusts' indebtedness to Areljay consisted of
notes payable on demand, with the remainder being loans on open account.
5 The Commissioner applied an interest rate of 6% per annum to the daily balance of the
loans outstanding during the year to arrive at a gift of $1,086,407.75. One-third of this
amount was allocated personally to Lester Crown. Id. at 235. A more detailed breakdown of
the Commissioner's computation may be found in Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1860,
1862 (1977).
6 67 T.C. 1060, 1065 (1977).
7 585 F.2d at 241.
8 id. at 237-40.
9 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2501 imposes a tax "for each calendar quarter on the trans-
fer of property by gift."
10 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2512(b) provides in full:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the
value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing
the amount of gifts made during the calendar quarter.
" "No statutory language or statements in the legislative history have been cited dealing
specifically with interest-free loans." 585 F.2d at 237.
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Though the court found that Congress intended broad interpretation 2
of the gift tax statute, it concluded that the Commissioner had failed to
show an unequal exchange." The Commissioner tried to show that the
trusts' promise to repay was not equal in money's worth to the loans and
that the time value of money reinforces the idea that a promise to repay in
the future does not equal the full value of the note at the time of the trans-
fer." However, in this case, the "pay on demand" notes did not allow a
time of repayment to be ascertained, as noted by the majority.15 Nor did
the court accept the Commissioner's computation based on multiplying the
outstanding balances of the loans by the market interest rate on similar
notes." This procedure would create a gift tax exceeding even the principal
if the lender refrained from calling the loan for a sufficiently long period."'
Thus, the court rejected the Commissioner's argument under Section 2512 (b)
for valuation of the transfer.
The majority countered the Commissioner's policy consideration with
its own policy considerations for rejecting interest-free loans as a taxable
event. The Commissioner had relied on the connection between the gift and
12 The committee reports relating to the interpretation of gift tax statutes show the scope
of the concepts:
[Tihe terms "property," "transfer," "gift," and "indirectly" are used in the broadest and
most comprehensive sense; the term "property" reaching every species of right or
interest protected by law and having an exchangeable value.
The words "transfer . . .by gift" and "whether .. .direct or indirect" are de-
signed to cover . .. all transactions . . .whereby property or a property right is
donatively passed to another, regardless of the means or device employed.
H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 27-28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 CuM. BULL.
(Part 2) 476; S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 CUM.
BULL. (Part 2) 524.
1 'The Commissioner presents no evidence in support of the latter proposition, i.e., unequal
exchange, but only the argument that the promise to repay the loan at some indefinite
time in the future and that given this time-value of money this must be worth less than its
face value." 585 F.2d at 238.
14 Id.
15 "The reason that the value at the time of the loan cannot be determined with greater
certainty is that the transfer of the economic benefit is incomplete at that point, being yet
totally dependent on the lender's continuing willingness to refrain from demanding payment."
Id.
16The Commissioner would find a gift to have occurred during any quarter in which there
were no-interest loans outstanding and would measure the amount of the gift by multi-
plying the outstanding balances by the market interest rate on similar notes. The im-
putation of interest in subsequent time periods is not a theoretically accurate measure
of the difference in value at the time of the loan between the money loaned and the
promise to repay.
Id. at 239.
11 The majority used this example to show how the gift tax could exceed the actual principal:
[I]f a lender makes a $1,000 no-interest loan and the "proper" interest rate is 10%,
under the IRS formula he would be treated as having made a gift of $100 in each year
the loan remains outstanding. If the loan remains outstanding for 20 years, he will
be treated as having made gifts totaling $2,000, whereas he would only have been
taxed on $1,000 if he had made a gift of the principal in the first place.
Id. at 239 n.14.
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estate tax, saying that such interest-free loans circumvented the estate tax
by reducing the value of the estate to an amount equal to the value of the
forgone interest. The court refused to agree for two reasons. First, as long
as the loans were payable on demand, the lender's estate could require the
loans to be repaid. Second, while the lender could have been earning interest
on the principal, our tax system does not require one to pay taxes on interest
which could have been, but was not, earned."8
Furthermore, administrative problems would be created by the im-
putation of interest. Courts would have to determine the appropriate rate
and taxpayers would not be able to know in advance whether a loan would
result in a gift. The breadth of such imputation could reach such transactions
as borrowing a small amount for a week. 9
The court observed that only one case, Johnson v. United States,2" had
dealt with the interest-free family loan. There no appeal was taken, despite
a holding for the taxpayer that no gift was made by the forebearance of
interest.2 ' Although non-acquiescence to that decision was published in
Revenue Ruling 73-61,11 the court noted inactivity on the Commissioner's
part to pursue the interest-free loan's taxability under the gift statute. 3
A brief but strong dissent relied on the broad interpretation of Sections
2501, 25114 and 25 12 (b), as evidenced by legislative history. 5 The dissent
criticized the majority for recognizing a benefit in substance, but dismissed
the form as inapplicable to the gift tax guidelines established by Congressional
intent. 6
Despite the lack of case law on point, 7 there are cases which have
dealt with the taxability of interest-free loans.2" Two factual points distinguish
those cases from Crown: (1) the loans had been between corporations or
is Id. at 236.
19Id. at 241.
20 Id. at 240. See Note, 19 STAN. L. REV. 870 (1967).
21 585 F. 2d at 240.
22 Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 408.
23 585 F.2d at 241.
24 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2511 expands § 2501 to apply "whether the transfer is in trust or
otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal,
tangible or intangible ....
25 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
26 585 F.2d at 242 (Van Pelt, C.J., dissenting).
27 'The question of whether the loan of property or cash constitutes a taxable gift by the
lender if no charge of an inadequate charge is made for the loan is unsettled." C. LOWNDES,
R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES § 26.15 (3d ed. 1974).
28 Kerry Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Joseph Lupowitz
Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974); B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner,
453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972); J. Simpson Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
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businesses, and (2) the Commissioner had employed Section 48229 as his
basis for deficiency. The court's consistent rejection of IRS attempts to
impute the taxable income was noted by citation to I. Simpson Dean v. Com-
missioner."0 The imputing of interest was rejected in Dean since there was
neither a case holding nor an administrative ruling or regulation which
recognized the income to the taxpayer. 1 However, an equally persuasive
counter-argument exists in Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner,"2
in which the lender had interest income for interest-free loans made to the
parent corporation determined under Section 482, as amplified by Regula-
tion 1.482-1.33 The Ninth Circuit in Kerry Investment Co. v. Commissioner"
held that an allocation of income could be made even if the interest-free loan
did not result in the production of gross income to the borrower. 5 The
taxpayer in Kerry had made interest-free loans to a subsidiary corporation
wholly owned by the taxpayer. The court remarked that "any scheme which
permits related entities to regulate their tax obligations by transfer and
retransfer of monies between themselves should be carefully scrutinized." 8
The Crown dissent agreed with this idea, particularly in light of the large
amount of the transfer involved. 7
Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner8 differs from Kerry and
Latham Park, and from B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner"9 in that the Lupo-
witz court found there to be contributions to capital instead of loans."' In
Forman, however, the court found that the Commissioner was entitled to
allocate interest where the lender-taxpayer had waived a right to interest on
notes paying 5% per annum. 1 Gertrude H. Blackburn v. Commissioner,"
29 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 482 reads in pertinent part:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses . . . owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or
allocate gross income [or] deductions . . . between or among such organizations, trades,
or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income ....
30 585 F.2d at 240.
31 35 T.C. at 1089.
8269 T.C. 199 (1977).
88Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (1968). Regulation 1.482-1(a) provides definitions of terms used
in Section 482, and Regulation 1.482-1(b) establishes the standard to be applied as "that of
an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer."
84 580 F.2d at 110.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 109.
37 585 F.2d at 241-42 (Van Pelt, C.J., dissenting).
38 497 F.2d at 862.
39453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972).
40 See 497 F.2d at 865-66 for an explanation of the court's reasoning in determining whether
the transfer should be considered debt or equity.
41 453 F.2d at 1156.
4220 T.C. 204 (1953).
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cited by the Commissioner in Crown, dealt not with an interest-free loan,
but with a transaction for less than adequate consideration between relatives
that resulted in a gift." The mother transferred real property to her children
for a note worth less than the fair market value of the transferred property,
the note bearing interest at a rate of 2 / % per annum. The opinion of the
Commissioner was sustained in finding a gift equal to the difference in the
interest charged and the market rate of 4%.
These cases show that the Service recognizes the transfer of an economic
benefit in the interest-free family loan, but that such a transaction does not
come within the purview of Code Section 482 by virtue of the types of
parties involved, i.e., relatives instead of businesses. The creation of income
theory under Section 482 is akin to the gift tax question, but there is a
problem as to whether interest should be imputed on such a loan and
treated as a property interest subject to gift tax."
Yet the remedy under the gift statutes was rejected in Johnson, the only
case found on point, where taxpayers had made interest-free loans to their
children. The Johnson court rejected the deficiency summarily by saying
that Section 2501 did not cover this transaction and that the loans did not
reduce the estate of the taxpayers nor defeat the purposes of the gift statute."'
The court found no legal requirement for interest and commented that "the
time has not come when a parent must suddenly deal at arm's length with
his children."4 6 Crown dealt with interpretation of statutes and policy con-
siderations in more detail than did Johnson." Neither Johnson nor Crown,
in either the Tax Court or the Seventh Circuit opinion, 8 dealt with the use
of interest as a property right spoken of in Section 2511."'
In criticizing the nontaxability of interest-free family loans, a number
of commentators note the similarity of such loans to a revocable or short-
term trust, but also point out the dissimilarity between the tax treatment
of the trust and that of the interest-free family loan.5" The trust requires
the donor to pay gift tax on the corpus and the donee to pay income tax
4 Id. at 204-06.
44 Hooton, Gift Tax Analysis of Non-Interest Bearing Loans, 54 TAXEs 635, 639 (1976).
5 254 F. Supp. at 77.
' 
6
1d.
41 Compare 585 F.2d at 237-41 with 254 F. Supp. at 77.
" See generally 585 F.2d at 234-41; 254 F. Supp. at 73-77; 67 T.C. at 1060-70.
49 See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
0 Carey, Interest-Free Loans and the Gift Tax, 38 OMO ST. L.J. 903, 909 (1977); Hooton,
supra note 44, at 639-40; O'Hare, Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VANI. L. REV. 1085,
1091 (1974); Note, 42 ALBANY L. REV. 471, 477 (1978); Note, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 361,
371 (1977).
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on the income generated by the corpus. But the net result of Crown is an
avoidance of both the income and gift tax.51
Consequently, the Crown decision, as commentators and tax planners
have noted, allows the interest-free family loan to provide an effective estate
and tax planning device." Even after the Johnson decision, one tax plan-
ning article specifically outlined an interest-free loan plan to escape taxation."
The attributes of the suggested plan are: (a) the lender should retain no
control implicitly or explicitly over the funds to avoid an inference of as-
signment; (b) the transaction should be evidenced in writing with adequate
repayment provisions which are enforced; and (c) there should be a specific
provision in the agreement for no interest. Interest-free loans allow an in-
dividual in a higher bracket to avoid taxes through "income splitting,"' "
completely contravening the purpose of the gift statutes.5
In discussing administrative considerations in Crown, the majority did
not discuss Section 2503(b)5" which provides a $3,000 threshold for gift
taxation. This weakens the policy consideration argument regarding ad-
ministrative problems since a significant amount of money could be loaned
without interest before a taxpayer would reach the $3,000 limit.5 Another
weak point in the decision is the failure of the opinion to decide specifically
whether forebearance of interest is a property right covered by Section 2511.
Instead, the decision focuses upon valuation difficulties which would prob-
ably pose no problem since the market value of interest is fairly ascertainable.
As the Crown majority stated, the only recorded case on point is
Johnson v. United States.58 But the Crown court bolstered its argument by
finding analogous cases under the income tax statutes. The Crown court fol-
lowed the reasoning of Johnson by implying that interest-free family loans
51 See Frazier, Interest-Free Loans between Family Members, 48 J. OF TAX. 28 (1978).
5
2 Aslanides & McGowan, Interest-Free Loans Get Green Light as Compensation and Estate
Planning Devices, 7 TAXATION 132, 136-37 (1978); Burke, Interest-Free Family Loans-Avail-
able as a Tax Planning Tool?, 48 TAXES 137 (1970); Cooper, New Perspectives on Sophis-
ticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLuM. L. REV. 161, 186 (1977); Hyde, Income and Gift
Tax Implications of Interest-Free Loans between Relatives, 1 B.Y.U.L. REv. 155, 176 (1978);
Rumpler, A Tax Loophole For Everyone, 1 OHIO C.P.A. 15 (1979); Tidwell, Lester Crown
Points the Way to Estate Tax Reduction Under the 1976 Tax Reform Act, 55 TAXES 651
(1977); Note, 19 B.C.L. REV. 359, 360 (1977).
53 Burke, supra note 52, at 138-39.
54 Hyde, supra note 52, at 176; Note, supra note 52, at 360.
55 See Lowndes, supra note 27, at § 22.2 for a discussion of the general purpose of the gift tax
as a supplement to estate and income taxes.
56 Ir. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 2503(b) excludes the first $3,000 for gift tax purposes per tax-
payer per year.
7 If the market value of interest were 10%, a taxpayer could loan $30,000 before reaching
the $3,000 floor under Section 2503(b). A married couple, for instance, could loan $60,000 if
the interest rate were 10%.
58 585 F.2d at 236.
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should be dealt with specifically by statute or regulation because of the
familial status of the parties and because foregone interest is not statutorily
held to constitute a gift. Additionally, Crown looked to decisions in the
Second, Third and Ninth Circuits which considered the question of taxability
of interest-free loans based on the income tax. As the court observed, these
circuits were loathe to impute interest until Treasury Regulation 1.482-2
was promulgated.59 If the Crown majority was correct in its observation
of these courts' decisions, it would follow that at least these three circuits
would wait for comparable regulatory guidelines in the area of gift taxes.
The reluctance of the district court in Johnson and of the aforementioned
circuits to impute interest without specific guidelines indicates that cases
comparable to Crown should be favorable to the taxpayer in these courts.
Since Crown did not mention any other circuits' decisions, it is not
safe to assume that the unmentioned circuits would find for the taxpayer.
Even if other circuits decide against the taxpayer, there could be a further
split in the way they allow the Commissioner to compute interest. In that
case, a statute, regulation or Supreme Court decision would be necessary for
clarification. Of these options, a statute or regulation would provide the
least ambiguity since a Supreme Court decision would offer a sound solution
only for cases on point with the decided cases.
Two statutory or regulatory possibilities exist to make such situations
taxable. Section 482 could be expanded to include individuals who are
related to place interest-free family loans within the sphere of the income tax.
Otherwise, the statute or regulation must provide gift taxation of the foregone
interest. Specifically, such a provision might value such loans at a flat rate
to save judicial speculation" and to afford a specific, uniform tax. At the
same time it would allow intrafamily loans at an interest rate lower than what
might be expected in an arm's length transaction. The gift tax could be
satisfied and so could policy considerations concerning intrafamily dealings
without the burden of an arm's length evaluation.
Until such a statute or regulation is enacted in either the income or
gift tax provisions, the Crown decision will permit the interest-free family
loans to avoid both the gift and income taxes and to provide an estate plan-
ning device.
LINDA HAUGHT ROBB
59 Id. at 240.
60 See Carey, supra note 50, at 918,
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